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other could not effect county tax liability.
McLean imposes a difficult practical burden on tax officials, intensified by the inclusion of understated property within the discovery
statute. Under McLean, tax officials are placed in a dilemma: if they
hesitate to make a discovery, awaiting, for example, a ruling on an
exemption question, the discovery might be foreclosed by the adjournment of the board of equalization and review; on the other hand, if they
list the property without awaiting a ruling, they risk initiating an unwarranted discovery proceeding.
In dealing with a case in which an understatement of inventory is
suspected, a tax official seeking to minimize the impact of McLean will
probably have to list "value of unlisted inventory" as soon as he has
reasonable grounds for assuming that substantial understatement is
present. Valuation may be deferred until supporting data are available,
at which time the board of equalization and review or the board of
county commissioners can make an appraisal, perhaps after state income and franchise returns have been examined. 5 Such an approach
places a premium on gamesmanship at the expense of orderly administration. Fortunately for tax officials, they are not liable for honest errors
they make in listing. Until the result in McLean is altered by statute or
subsequent decision, ad valorem tax discovery procedures in North Carolina will remain in some disorder.
THOMAS S. STUKES

Constitutional Law-Changes in Party Affiliation and the Right to Vote
in the Primary
Does the Constitution allow a state to bar a qualified voter from
voting in a party primary for a period of months or even years after he
has switched his party affiliation or last participated in another party's
nominating procedures? The Supreme Court's increasing solicitude for
the right to vote and for freedom to associate for political purposes has
culminated within the last few years in the application of its new "com"One useful result of McLean is that it prevents supervisors from diplomatically. arbitrating
a valuation on the discovered property before it is listed. This has been a common practice not
sanctioned under the statute. Valuation occurs after the listing of the property. The tax supervisor
places a valuation on the property if it is feasible and the final valuation is set by the appropriate
board. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312(d) (1972).
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pelling state interest" test' to cases challenging restrictions on the right
to vote as a violation of equal protection and restrictions on freedom
of association as a violation of due process, both guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. 2 At the same time, voters have apparently abandoned traditional, long-term party loyalty in favor of an increasing
tendency to vote for particular candidates or for the party most acceptable to them in a particular election. Since the beginning of 1971, federal
courts in several states have faced challenges to the constitutionality of
state statutes which condition a person's right to vote in his party's
primary elections solely on the length of time since he switched his party
registration or since he last participated in primary or convention activities of another party, without regard to the voter's motives or to the
bona fide character of the switch.'
In Rosario v. Rockefeller,4 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld a New York law5 requiring changes in party affiliation
to be made before the last general election preceding the primary (a
period of approximately seven to nine months) in order for the new
party member to be eligible to vote in the next primary. Reversing the
district court's decision, the appellate court found no constitutional
restriction on the right to vote or freedom of association and no violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection.' The
state had justified its statute as necessary to protect the integrity of the
political party system in that it prevented "raiding," which was defined
as "voters of one party fraudulently designating themselves as voters of
another party in order to determine the results of the raided party's
primary. ' 7 The Second Circuit accepted the state's argument that the
'See Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 715-16 (1970) for an analysis
of the elements of the compelling state interest test.
2See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), for explicit recognition of the application of
the "compelling state interest test" to alleged denials of both the right to vote and the freedom of
association.
3Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2062 (1972) (No.
71-1371); Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447 (D.R.I. 1972); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415
(D.N.J. 1972); Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1972), appeal docketed, 40
U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631); Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153
(E.D. La. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715); Gordon
v. Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 335 F. Supp. 166 (D.S.C. 1971) (per curiam).
'458 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2062 (1972) (No. 71-1371).
5N.Y. ELECTIONs LAW § 186 (McKinney 1964).

6The court of appeals also reversed the district court's holding that § 186 violated the Voting
Rights Act of 1970. Since this note considers the constitutonal issues of Rosario and comparable
federal district court cases and since no other case on point discussed this issue, the Roasrio court's
treatment of the statutory challenge will not be examined.
1458 F.2d at 651.
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prevention of raiding is a compelling state interest and held that the
means chosen for protecting the interest represented a minimal infringement on first and fourteenth amendment rights.
Until very recently, the right to vote in state elections was considered a mere privilege granted by the state subject to any restrictions the
states might wish to impose, provided only that the state not violate the
Constitution in regulating the franchise. 8 Citizens had no "right" to vote
in state elections, 9 and the state wielded virtually unlimited powers in
the regulation of voting in its elections. 0 Although these earlier cases
are still cited in current decisions, the emphasis has shifted to the restriction that the regulations imposed by the states not violate any part of
the Constitution."
In recent years the Supreme Court has treated the franchise as a
right protected by the Constitution, even though not expressly guaranteed for state elections:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room
for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
2
right.'
In Reynolds v. Sims 3 the Supreme Court described the right of suffrage as a "fundamental matter in a free and democratic society" and
emphasized its importance by requiring that "any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."' 4
The right to vote in a party primary receives the same zealous
protection and is subjected to the same tests of constitutionality whenever the primary elections determine candidates for the general election
or have been made an essential or integral step in the election process.15
'Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
'Yet as early as 1886, while still recognized as a mere privilege rather than an absolute right
guaranteed by the Constitution, voting was characterized as "a fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
"Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
"E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91
(1965).
"Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
13377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"Id. at 561-62.
"Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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The traditional test for the constitutionality of a statute allegedly
in violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection
required only that the classification be rationally related to the achievement of legitimate state goals which the statute was designed to effect.
In the application of this test, the law was presumed constitutional;
unless the classification was wholly irrelevant to the state's objective, the
act was upheld. 6 However, the Court increasingly carved out exceptions
to the general rule and required stronger justification whenever certain
types of classifications, based on "suspect criteria" or affecting "fundamental rights," were involved.17 In Williams v. Rhodes1 the Supreme
Court explicitly held that only a "compelling state interest" could justify
infringements on the "precious freedoms" of "the right of qualified
voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively" and "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement
of political beliefs."' 9 The following year, in Kramer v. Union Free
School District,'"the Court applied the "compelling state interest test"
to a New York law permitting only parents and guardians of children
enrolled in local schools and the owners and lessees of taxable real
property in the district to vote for members of district school boards."
As applied in Kramer, the test dictates that any statute affecting the
right to vote must be carefully scrutinized and should be upheld only if
it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest 22 and if the classifi"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). For arguments that the compelling

state interest test is an invalid measure of infringements on the right to vote, and application of
the traditional standard, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan,
J.,
dissenting).
"See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J.,dissenting);
Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 477 (1970); Note,
Durational Residency Requirements in State Elections: Blumstein v. Ellington, 46 IND. L.J. 222

(1971).
18393 U.S. 23 (1968).

"Id.
at 30.
-395 U.S. 621 (1969).
211d.
"More recently, the Court applied the compelling state interest test to durational residency
requirements which bar participation in state or local elections until the voter has been a resident
of the state or locality for a prescribed length of time. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972),
Tennessee's statute requiring a year's residency in the state and three months in the county for
eligibility to vote in state and local elections was struck down on the ground that the time limitation
was only tenuously related to the state's need for knowledgeable voters or to its valid interest in
preventing fraud. States can effect their interest in requiring that voters be bona fide residents by
tests aimed directly at the elements of residency rather than by conclusively presuming that staying
in the district a designated period of time automatically converts the person into a bona fide
resident sufficiently knowledgeable about the issues to exercise the franchise.
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cation was drawn with sufficient precision to be deemed necessary to
achieve the state's asserted goal.?

The decision in Rosario and the issues it presents should be evaluated in the context of the several recent federal district court opinions
examining similar statutes. 24 In Fontham v. McKeithen,21 the sole case
besides Rosario to sustain such a law, a six-month suspension of eligibility to vote in a party primary2 6 was approved by the federal district court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana. However, the court applied the
traditional "rational relation" test for equal protection cases, an ap-

proach which seems clearly erroneous in view of the pattern of Supreme
Court decisions.27
2ln a number of cases, including Kramer, the Court has avoided the question of whether the
interest asserted by the state in support of its challenged legislation constituted a compelling state
interest; instead, it held that the classification was not drawn with sufficient precision to be deemed
"necessary to promote" the state's goal. E.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per
curiam).
"There is no Supreme Court decision which actually confronts this question. Jordan v. Meisser, 92 S. Ct. 947 (1972) (mem.), has sometimes been claimed to be on point; however, Jordan
was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question because the plaintiff there could have
enrolled after the normal deadline under an exception for prsons who did not have the age,
residential, or other qualificatons at the time of the normal deadline for registration of one's party
affiliation. See 458 F.2d at 654 n.6.
Two other Supreme Court cases are sometimes cited as supporting the constitutional validity
of durational party membership requirements. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), dealt with
Georgia's restrictions on a person's eligibility to get on the ballot. The Court found no onerous
limitations or inequities in the different routes for achieving a place on the ballot such as were found
in Williams v. Rhodes, in which the restrictions strongly favored certain parties and were so great
as to affect voters' rights to vote for the candidates of their choice.
In Lippitt v. Cipollone, 92 S. Ct. 729 (1972) (mem.), affg 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio
1971), Ohio law denying a candidate's right to run in the primary of one party within four years
of the time he voted as a member of a different party was held constitutional. The fact that the
Supreme Court has left at least three of the six cases dealt with in this note, involving durational
party membership requirements for eligibility to vote in primary elections, on its docket a substantial period of time suggests that it does not consider Lippitt, or the considerations on which it based
its almost immediate decision in Lippitt, as dispositive of the issue. The right of a person to run
as a candidate is not given the constitutional protection accorded the right to vote; thus, issues in
the two kinds of cases involve different considerations unless restrictions on candidacy are so
burdensome that they infringe on the right to vote or other fundamental rights, as in Williams v.
Rhodes. Bendinger v. Ogilvie, 335 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Il1.1971); Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp.
447, 452 (D.R.I. 1972); Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108-09 (N.D. 111.1972), appeal
docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631).
2336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971), appealdocketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971)
(No. 71-715).
"LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:270.204 (Supp. 1972).
"See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
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In Gordon v. Executive Committee of the Democratic Party,28 a
federal district court struck down provisions of a South Carolina law
which required a voter in a primary election to swear that he had not
voted in any primary, convention, or precinct meeting of another political party that year.2 9 The "real intent of the statute," as interpreted by
the court, was to prevent voting in two primaries for the same election;
consequently, the enactment was upheld only to the extent it proscribed
this fraudulent practice.30 Although Gordon was one of the first decisions in the country to deal with the question of durational membership
requirements for voting in primary elections, the court's per curiam
opinion did not treat the issue of "raiding" at all.
In Yale v. Curvin,31 Pontikes v. Kusper,32 and Nagler v. Stiles,33
however, three-judge federal district courts declared unconstitutional
statutes specifically described as designed to prevent "raiding" of one
party by members of another. In each of these cases the restriction on
the first to vote was much more severe than in Rosario. New Jersey
required a voter to abstain from voting in two subsequent annual primary elections before voting in the primary of another party. 4 Rhode
Island denied a voter the right to vote in a primary for twenty-six
months after voting in another party's primary or signing candidates'
petitions to run in another party's primary or as an independent." And
Illinois permitted voters to participate in primaries only after twentythree months had elapsed since they last voted in the primary of any
other party. All three of these cases regarded the prevention of raiding
as a legitimate, perhaps even compelling, state interest, but felt that the
means adopted by the legislatures imposed greater restrictions on the
right to vote than were necessary to achieve the professed goal. Under
these constructions the statutes failed to meet the "compelling state
interest" test.
The opinions in Yale v. Curvin and Nagler v. Stiles, both of which
were decided after Rosario v. Rockefeller, sought to distinguish Rosario
"335 F. Supp. 166 (D.S.C. 1971) (per curiam).
"S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.71 (Supp. 1971).
"335 F. Supp. at 169.
31345 F. Supp. 447 (D.R.I. 1972).
12345 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. I1. 1972), appealdocketed,40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16,1972)
(No. 71-1631).
"343 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1972).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-45 (1964).
3R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-15-24, -16-8 (1969).
"6ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-43(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
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as involving a less onerous burden on the right to vote and on the
freedom to associate for political purposes. Yet much of the reasoning
of these cases, as well as the earlier Pontikes v. Kusper, would seem to
apply equally to the less restrictive statute involved in Rosario.
Rosario was clearly correct in measuring the right of a citizen to
vote in a party primary against the compelling state interest test, despite
the Fontham court's conclusion to the contrary. Any burden or condition imposed on the right to vote requires the same close scrutiny elicited by an actual denial of the franchise." The normal presumption of
constitutionality of state legislation is derived from the basic assumption
that the institutions of state government are structured to represent
fairly all the people. When a challenged statute denies or conditions the
right to vote, the challenge in effect attacks the foundation underlying
the presumption of constitutonality, and the presumption cannot be
invoked.38 The burden thus devolves upon the state to justify both the
interest served by the enactment and the means chosen to achieve that
interest whenever fundamental rights are limited or denied.39
Does the prevention of raiding constitute a "compelling state interest" as the court held in Rosario? "'Raiding' occurs when members of
one party vote in the primary of another party for the sole purpose of
bringing about the nomination of the weakest candidate."' " The Court
has repeatedly recognized a compelling state interest in the prevention
of fraud and corruption.41 The need to protect against subversion of the
party system by persons with no loyalty voting in its primary is analogous to the state's desire to bar non-residents from entering the state,
pretending to be residents, and voting in its elections-an interest upheld
in Dunn v. Blumstein as a "legitimate and compelling governmental
goal."42 Federal courts have nonetheless split on the issue of whether the
44
prevention of raiding qualifies as a compelling state interest.43 Rosario
31Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.

Ct. 995, 1000 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Green v.
McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Mich. 1971); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969). But see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
"Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972).
1"Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1972), appealdocketed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631); accord,Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447,450-51 (D.R.I.
1972); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415, 416 (D.N.J. 1972).
"See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 92 S. Ct. 849, 857 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,

637 (1969).
"92 S. Ct. at 1004.
"'The difference apparently stems from doubts by some courts that raiding represents a
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and Nagler v. Stiles45 said "yes," Gordon" found no compelling purpose
which could possibly justify restrictions of this nature on the right to
vote, and Yale v. Curvin47 avoided the issue as unnecessary for the
disposition of the case.
Even if the compelling interest is found to exist, the means chosen
to achieve the professed state goal must still be evaluated. Only if the
classification is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state
interest can restrictions on fundamental rights be upheld.48 Not only
must the state adopt means which actually tend to help achieve its goal,
it must follow the least burdensome path of furthering even the most
compelling interest. "[I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve
those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,
a State may not choose the way of greater interference.""9 Rosario
found a minimal invasion of constitutional rights in the New York
statute requiring changes in party affiliation before the preceding general election in order to vote in the primary. However, the court's argument seemed to turn on the assumption that no measures less restrictive
would be equally effective in preventing raiding. "Allowing enrollment
any time after the general election would not have the same deterrent
effect on raiding for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position
of asking to be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending
to vote immediately for another.""0 The Rasario court dismissed the
provision for challenges to individual voters as too cumbersome to
serve as an effective barrier against bad faith party cross-overs since no
objective criteria exist for testing party loyalty in contrast to the concrete evidence available to establish a voter's place of residency. 2
substantial threat to the electoral process rather than from any disagreement over the legitimacy
of the goal. See, e.g., Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. II1. 1972), appeal
docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631). A state cannot logically justify

restrictions on fundamental rights as a means of preventing an event which is unlikely to occur
even without preventive measures.
1458 F.2d at 652.
45343 F. Supp. at 417-18.
11335 F. Supp. at 169.
47345 F. Supp. at 453.
8

Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1972); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,

704 (1969) (per curiam); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
4
Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972).

11458 F.2d at 653.
5
N.Y. ELECTIONS
11458 F.2d at 653.

LAW

§ 332 (McKinney 1964).
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Yet, as Pontikes v. Kusper pointed out, it is not clear that raiding
would constitute a substantial problem in the absence of statutes limiting the right to vote in primaries after a change in party affiliation.
"There is no evidence to indicate that raiding is more likely to take place
than 'honest' switches of affiliation. Forty-four states do not impose
post-election restraints on changing affiliation. This would indicate that
raiding is not a serious threat to the multi-party system. 5 3 In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it would seem that these other six
states could get along with laws merely requiring an oath of affiliation
and providing for individual challenges of alleged raiders just as easily
as the forty-four. 4 In fact, the primary function of such restrictive
statutes may be to protect the advantage of the dominant party by
imposing a high price on transfers of party allegiance rather than to
serve the avowed purpose of preserving party integrity. 5
The difficulty of preventing raiding by the use of individual challenges does not necessarily justify resorting to more restrictive techniques for achieving the same goal. Adoption of a conclusive presumption of non-residency until a would-be voter has been in the state a
specified length of time56 or as long as he remains in the military service57 has been held to violate the equal protection clause. Conclusive
presumptions barring certain classes of would-be voters from the franchise almost inevitably violate the compelling state interest test by excluding some citizens with a stake in the outcome equal to that of other
individuals allowed to vote. Admittedly, existence of an improper motive for switching party registration is less susceptible of proof than
residency, but it is not necessarily impossible to ascertain. Significantly,
the burden is on the state to prove the necessity of a challenged statute
as a means of achieving a. compelling interest. 9 If forty-four states
manage without such prohibitive laws, the remaining six presumably
should not be able to limit the franchise in this manner without demon"Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. II1.1972), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631); accord, Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447, 451 (D.R.I.
1972); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415, 417 (D.N.J. 1972).
"See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-59, -74, -87 (1972).
"Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153, 173-74 (E.D. La. 1971) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting)
appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1007 (1972).
"7Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"See Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1007 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96
(1965).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
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strating a special need for more stringent protection against raiding, a
need which has apparently not been established."
Is the requirement that a voter change his party registration six
months in advance of the primary or before the preceding general election effective in preventing raiding? According to the court in Rosario,
"[flew persons have the effrontery or the foresight to enroll as say,
'Republicans' so that they can vote in a primary some seven months
hence, when they full well intend to vote 'Democratic' in only a few
weeks."" On the other hand, it seems doubtful that anyone unscrupulous enough to change his party affiliation with the intent of sabotaging
the primary of a party to which he feels no loyalty would actually be
deterred by the relatively minor inconsistency involved in making the
switch before a general election in which he intends to vote for a different party. New York's law simply requires the malicious crossregistrant to plan ahead12 and is much less likely to restrain the potential
"raider" than the person who honestly feels that his over-all party loyalty lies with a party other than the one which he prefers in the upcoming general election.13 One of the factors on which Dunn v. Blumstein
turned was the recognition that honest new residents would be barred
from voting while those willing to swear falsely to length of residency
would not;64 the New York primary law is similarly too imprecisely
"Rosario sought to justify the New York statute by the existence of the smaller Conservative
and Liberal parties, which were considered particularly vulnerable to raiding and were offered as
evidence of New York's special need for protection against raiding. 458 F.2d at 652 n.3. But this

fact alone cannot license a state to deny or restrict the right to vote in ways that would otherwise
be constitutionally impermissible without some showing that raiding is likely to occur or that less
stringent restrictions are insufficient to repel the danger.
61458 F.2d at 653.
6
See Fontham v. MeKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153, 174 (E.D. La. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissenting),
appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715).

OConceivably, the states are actually seeking to "preserve the integrity of the political party
system" by denying primary participation to anyone who does not exhibit a more or less permanent
attachment to the party. But the need for stability of the political system does not justify exclusion

of voters lacking long-term party attachments anymore than the need for political stability of a
state authorizes the unconstitutional goal of "fencing out" from the franchise persons with views

alien to the state and who have not been residents long enough to absorb state attitudes or at least
to develop feelings of loyalty towards the state. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53 (1969) (per curiam)

(Marshall, J., dissenting): Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965). Nor is it clear that allowing relatively unrestricted
switches in party membership will damage the party system. Historically, many politicians as well
as individual members have changed their party affiliation for opportunistic as well as ideological
reasons; changes of this type may well add vitality to the party system rather than dilute it. Lippitt
v. Cipollone, 92 S. Ct. 729, 730 (1972) (mem.) (Douglas, J., dissenting), affg 337 F. Supp. 1405

(1971).

6492 S. Ct. at 1005.
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drawn to achieve its asserted purpose and gives the very person the law
is intended to restrict an advantage over the honest citizen who falls
within its terms.
If the time limit imposed on party membership as a condition to
voting in the primary elections excludes people who have as strong a
loyalty to the party or interest in the outcome of the primary as a
substantial number of the long-time party members, the statute cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.65 Such time limits are inappropriate
in a period when voters increasingly base their choice upon the candidate or the parties' stands on a current issue. 6 Voters need not commit
their loyalties to a party on a long-term basis, from the national down
to the local level, to qualify as being genuinely interested in a primary
election. 7 Candidates within the same party frequently recommend conflicting programs; the national party may espouse issues totally different
from those with which the local party is concerned; and the events of
any moment may focus the spotlight on previously insignificant questions or completely re-align the standing of potential candidates. The
privilege of voting for any candidate in a primary should not be contingent upon the voter's willingness to commit himself far in advance to a
party whose candidates and issues may stand for opposite positions on
different levels of government or at different times. While the six-month
period of the New York law permits a more knowledgeable decision and
greater flexibility in adjusting to changing issues and candidates on
varying levels of government, the difference between the statute examined by Rosario and the twenty-six-month law of Rhode Island is
merely a matter of degree. Even six months beforehand, the issues and
candidates of a particular election are often unidentifiable; many voters
in sympathy with the stand of one party or its candidates for that
election would be barred from voting in its primary because they were
unable to discern until too late how the choice would present itself.68
"5In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969), the Supreme Court held

that "[w]hether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens 'primarily
interested' deny those excluded equal protection of the laws depends, interalia,on whether all those

excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes."
6

Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447, 451 (D.R.I. 1972).
"Id. at 453; Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (N.D. I11.1972), appeal docketed,
40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631).
appeal docketed, 40 336 F. Supp. 153, 174 (E.D. La. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), appeal
docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715).
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CONCLUSION

Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit characterized the New York law as a minimal infringement on the precious
freedom of association and the right to vote, the reasoning behind several federal district court cases dealing with comparable, more restrictive statutes would seem to call for a contrary interpretation of the effect
of New York law. The compelling state interest test for determining
whether restrictions on fundamental rights are unconstitutional requires
that the state interest furthered by the legislation be a compelling one,
that the statute carry the burden of justifying the restriction, that the
restriction be necessary to promote the interest, and that the classification be precisely tailored so that the lines of exclusion correspond almost
exactly with the exclusions necessary for achievement of the legislative
goal. The Second Circuit apparently diluted the compelling state interest test, for it ignored the requirement that the classification be precisely
tailored. It found the restriction necessary to achieve the state's interest
in preventing raiding even though it was not clear that raiding constituted a significant problem or that much less restrictive means might
not suffice to deal with whatever danger was present. In view of the
development of the compelling state interest test and its recent application to durational residency requirements for voting, restrictions on the
right to vote in primary elections cannot be conditioned upon the length
of time since the voter switched his party registration or voted in another
party's primary. The right to vote, whether in a general or primary
election, ranks among the most cherished rights of our democratic system. Without strong evidence that raiding represents a serious threat to
the integrity of the electoral process, no state can justify denying a
citizen's fundamental constitutional right to vote in a primary election
solely because he participated in the nominating procedure of another
party for a recent prior election or within a specified period of time.
NORMA

S. HARRELL

Constitutional Law-Cognovit Notes: Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional
Rights in Civil Cases
In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.1 and its companion case, Swarb
192 S. Ct. 775 (1972).

